Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

October 22,2004

MEMORANDUM FOR KYLE E. MCSLARROW

DEPUTY SECRETARY

FROM: LINTON F. BROOKS

ADMINISTRATOR

NATIONAL NUCLE SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION

DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Review Options for the Protective Force: Phase XI

The first task established by your memorandum dated June 10,2004 prescribed a

review of missions, standards, and current protective force status as a basis for

developing recommendations on policy, training, equipment, and performance

testing leading to creating an "elite protective force". On August 3 1,2004, four

major recommendations were delivered to you that, if enacted, would serve as a

basis for the creating the "elite protective force". The Protective Force Working

Group (PFWG) noted that the recommendation represented "actions that can be

initiated-and in some instances completed-regardless of the overall

management concept". According to the PFWG, the long-term effectiveness of

these recommendations would likely be influenced by the protective force

management and contractual approaches that the Department chose to follow.

These recommendations are now summarized as Recommendation 1 of the

attached final PFWG report.

Consideration of the approaches best suited to ensure the long-term effectiveness

of the "elite protective force" represented the second phase of the PFWG's

activities. The attached paper and accompanying summary present the results of

those deliberations. As the second of the two major deliverables that were tasked,

it presents the PFWG's conclusions about the organizational model that best

supports the long-term foundations for the elite force concept. Consistent with

the Secretary's direction, the PFWG considered options ranging from the status

quo, which is the contractor-based approach, to the federalization of DOE

protective forces. The PFWG also considered options incorporating various

modifications to the existing contractor model. Because the Secretary defined the

elite force mandate in relationship to the need for achieving the highest level of

effectiveness at DOE facilities involved directly in the protection of nuclear

weapons, special nuclear material (SNM), and other strategic national security

assets, the group focused on those facilities. The PFWG's recommendation and

its supporting rationale are explicitly focus on creating a combat-effective

protective force designed to defeat a well-armed and dedicated terrorist adversary

at any of these facilities.

Although many aspects of the "elite protective force" initiative can be at least

partially realized through intermediate organizational modifications, the PFWG

has concluded that, in principle, the best long-term organizational foundation for

achieving the Secretary's objective is to convert the existing contractor protective

forces to Federal status. Because of the significant resulting challenges, the

PFWG recommends a two-track strategy that will 1) advance the goal of creating

the elite protective force; and 2) simultaneously permit additional analysis

necessary to present a fully-developed federalization option.

The world-changing events of September 1 1,2001, decisively subordinated the

old industrial security model to a "combat force" model. This new standard

carries profound legal and practical implications, all of which tend to support

adoption of the Federal force option. Given the number and variety of factors that

could impact achievement of the federalization option, it is not possible to project

a fixed end date for its completion. It is, however, reasonable to anticipate that

this could not be fully accomplished prior to FY 2007. Development of this

option represents Recommendation 2 of the attached report.

The recent adoption of the Department's new Design Basis Threat means that

management attention needs to focus on changes that can be achieved as quickly

as possible. These include practical changes in the policy, doctrine, tactical

organization, weapons, and equipment of the protective forces. They also require

a profound cultural change in the environment that shapes PF operations. To

cause the culture change required within the Department, a strong, clear statement

of roles and responsibilities should be issued at the Secretarial level. This

statement would transmit the Secretary's intent to transform the Department's

protective forces into elite forces. This statement should be followed by explicit

high level direction to enact the specific "elite force" recommendations presented

in Phase I of the PFWG's activities. This direction will require appropriate

support in near-term budget submissions.

Although the PFWG believes that federalization offers the best option by which

the "elite force" can be maintained over the long term, it also believes that the

Department cannot afford to wait for federalization in order to begin

implementing the elite force concept. It is essential that action be initiated

immediately.

The recommendations of this paper are designed to promote rapid improvement

of actual protective force performance while allowing additional time to test the

potential benefits of federalization against the practical difficulties of achieving its

implementation. Our priority must remain the creation and maintenance of a

combat force that is trained, equipped, and led professionally in the execution of

its inherently governmental function of protecting our most sensitive national

security assets.

Attachments:

1. Executive Summary

2. Position Paper

cc:

D. Garman, US

Attachment 1 *

STRENGTHENING SECURITY HUMAN CAPITAL EXPERTISE

#I4 Review Options for the Protective Force

Recommendations Concerning

Management and Contractual Approaches for Achieving "Elite" Force Status

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The following recommendations are presented by the Initiative # 14 Protective Force Working Group (PFWG) and result from detailed consideration of the approaches best suited to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the "elite protective force." In keeping with the Secretary's direction, the group considered options ranging from the status quo contractor-based approach to the federalization of DOE protective forces, including a variety of intermediate options involving various modifications to the existing contractor model. As discussed in the Phase I Report, the most important objective of this activity is the expeditious pursuit of excellence through immediate implementation of those measures previously recommended that do not require significant reorganization.

The PFWG has concluded that, in principle, the best long-term organizational foundation for achieving the Secretary's objective is the conversion of existing contractor protective forces to Federal status. The recommendation to federalize, along with its supporting rationale, is focused explicitly on the provision of a combat-effective protective force, designed to defeat a well-armed and dedicated terrorist adversary at any DOE facility involved directly in the protection of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material (SNM),

or other strategic national security assets. Because of the significant challenges involved, the PFWG is recommending a two-track strategy that will advance the goal of achieving the elite protective force while simultaneously permitting the conduct of the additional analysis necessary to present a fully developed federalization option. The recommendations of this paper are designed to promote rapid improvement of

actual protective force performance while allowing additional time to test the potential benefits of federalization against the practical difficulties of achieving its implementation. The two recommendations presented below are intended to emphasize immediate action in response to the recently promulgated Design Basis Threat (DBT) and to ensure the long term viability of the elite force concept. Recommendation I-Undertake the following specific actions designed to immediately elevate protective force capabilities to the elite level. Revise Departmental requirement to:

Infuse protective force policy with an "expectation of excellence" and an emphasis on

combating the armed terrorist threat.

Direct re-orientation of protective force assignments to concentrate resources in a tactical

posture.

Require development of tactical response plans that locate protective forces either in direct defense of target locations or in appropriate ready response positions.

Require effective integration of protective force response tactics with upgraded technological measures.

Relieve protective force personnel of non-essential routine duties to permit concentration on training and testing in support of their primary tactical mission.

Augment tactical response through the deployment of physical security systems designed to deny vehicle approach routes to targets and to extend the ability of protective forces to

identify and engage adversaries along all feasible pathways.

Deploy active and passive denial systems at target locations to reduce reliance on recapture operations.

Attachment 1

Implement medical and physical fitness standards necessary to support "elite force"

performance capabilities.

Maximize focus on tactical training by directing the initiation of training shifts and requiring imaginative and intensive on-shift training administered by supervisors or training personnel, coupled with individual and team limited scope performance testing.

Re-organize protective force shifts into tactically cohesive units with appropriate operational command, control and communications systems.

Require the Office of Security (SO) and the National Training Center (NTC) to develop and implement protective force supervisor tactical leadership doctrine and training.

Require more intensive and frequent line management and independent oversight of

protective force tactical performance.

Require more frequent performance testing of protective force individual and unit tactics,

Re-examine the applicability of industrial safety standards to the needed level of intensity and rigor in tactical training.

Emphasize devolution of law enforcement functions through expanded cooperative

arrangements with local law enforcement agencies.

Direct the immediate establishment of a combined field and Headquarters management

advisory team to review, prioritize, and develop a strategy for complex-wide implementation  of the tactical and training recommendations that are not explicitly addressed above.

Recommendation 2-Expand the PFWG charter to encompass the responsibility for development of a detailed action plan to federalize those DOE PFs directly involved in the protection of nuclear weapons, SNM, or other strategic national security assets. When this plan has been successfully completed, direct its execution.

The first recommendation is explicitly intended to rapidly advance the Department's protective forces to the level of capability necessary to counter the new DBT. The second recommendation is intended to provide a basis for developing concrete, detailed management options leading to the creation of a federalized force. The purpose of federalization is not to fulfill some abstract concept of management, but rather to provide a solid long-term foundation for a combat-oriented protective force. The actions

detailed in the first recommendation can and must be accomplished as rapidly as possible. The second recommendation, however, comprehends the fact that federalization cannot be rushed if it is to be effectively implemented. Furthermore, as the accompanying position paper makes clear, the long term goal of federalization does not preclude interim organizational and management reforms designed to improve the effectiveness of contractor-managed forces.

PREDECISIONAL DRAFT

STRENGTHENING SECURITY HUMAN CAPITAL EXPERTISE

#14 Review Options for the Protective Force

POSITION PAPER .

Recommendations Concerning Management and Contractual Approaches for Achieving "Elite" Force Status

1.0 Introduction

The deliberations of the Initiative #14 Protective Force Working Group (PFWG) were divided into two distinct phases.' In the first phase the PFWG developed four major recommendations that, if enacted, would serve as a basis for the creation of the "elite protective force" mandated by the Secretary of Energy. In presenting those recommendations, the PFWG noted that they represented "actions that can be initiated-and in some instances completed-regardless of the overall management concept" ultimately adopted by the Department. At the same time, the group also noted that "the long-term effectiveness of these recommendations would likely be influenced by the protective force management and contractual approaches" that the Department chose to follow. It is the considered opinion of the FFWG that immediate action on these Phase

I recommendations is the most important step that Department management can take at this juncture to ensure the necessary improvement in protective force capability.

The main focus of the PFWG's activities following the presentation of its Phase I upgrade

recommendations revolved around determining the best means to ensure that once these

upgrades were achieved, they would be sustained over the long term. This paper presents the results of this second phase of deliberations. As the second of two major deliverables, it presents the PFWG's conclusions regarding the structural/organizational models best suited to further the objective of sustaining the elite force concept over the long term. In keeping with the Secretary's direction, the group considered options ranging from the status quo contractor-based approach to the federalization of DOE protective forces, including a variety of intermediate options involving various modifications to the existing contractor model. Because the Secretary defined the "elite force" mandate in relationship to the need for achieving the highest level of protection effectiveness at DOE facilities involved directly in the protection of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material (SNM), or other strategic national security assets, the group focused on these facilitiesm2T he PFWG's recommendation and its supporting rationale are explicitly aimed at the provision of a combat-effective protective force, designed to defeat a well-armed and

dedicated terrorist adversary at any of these DOE facilities.

2.0 Recommendations

' The PFWG was composed of Federal and contractor staff representing SSA. NNSA, and ESE. Personnel were selected for their breadth and depth of experience with DOE protective force operations and included personnel with extensive field-level experience in the actual management and conduct of DOE protective force operations.

The group recognizes that the Department requires protective services in some form at a much broader range of administrative and research facilities. However. the protection requirements at these facilities do not rise to the level of the "combat force" model required to provide effective protection against the high-end terrorist threat described

in the current DOE Design Basis Threat.

Although many aspects of the "elite protective force" initiative can be at least partially realized through intermediate organizational modifications, the PFWG has concluded that, in principle, the best long-term organizational foundation for achieving the Secretary's objective is the conversion of existing contractor protective forces to Federal status. However, the PFWG recognizes also that this represents a substantial departure from historical Departmental practice, and that it would require overcoming significant organizational and legal challenges along the path to implementation. For this reason, the PFWG is recommending a two-track strategy that will advance the goal of achieving the elite protective force while simultaneously permitting the conduct of the additional analysis necessary to present a fully-developed federalization option. As noted in the previous PFWG submission, the Department's highest priority and greatest emphasis should be placed upon realizing those concrete upgrades that will result in near-term accomplishment of "elite force" objectives. The recommendations of this paper are designed to promote rapid improvement of actual protective force performance while allowing additional time to test the potential benefits of federalization against the practical difficulties of achieving its implementation.

The PFWG's two specific final recommendations are as follows:

Recommendation 1-

Undertake the following special actions designed to immediately elevate protective force capabilities to the elite level. Revise Departmental requirements to:

Infuse protective force policy with an "expectation of excellence" and an emphasis on

combating the armed terrorist threat.

Direct re-orientation of protective force assignments to concentrate resources in a

tactical posture.

Require development of tactical response plans that locate protective forces either in

direct defense of target locations or in appropriate ready response positions.

Require effective integration of protective force response tactics with upgraded

technological measures.

Relieve protective force personnel of non-essential routine duties to permit

concentration on training and testing in support of their primary tactical mission.

Augment tactical response through the deployment of physical security systems

designed to deny vehicle approach routes to targets and to extend the ability of

protective forces to identify and engage adversaries along all feasible pathways.

Deploy active and passive denial systems at target locations to reduce reliance on

recapture operations.

Implement medical and physical fitness standards necessary to support "elite force"

performance capabilities.

Maximize focus on tactical training by directing the initiation of training shifts and

requiring imaginative and intensive on-shift training administered by supervisors or

training personnel, coupled with individual and team limited scope performance

testing.

Re-organize protective force shifts into tactically cohesive units with appropriate

operational command, control and communications systems.

Require the Office of Security (SO) and the National Training Center (NTC) to

develop and implement protective force supervisor tactical leadership doctrine and

training.

Require more intensive and frequent line management and independent oversight of

protective force tactical performance.

Require more frequent performance testing of protective force individual and unit

tactics.

' Re-examine the applicability of industrial safety standards to the needed level of

intensity and rigor in tactical training.

Emphasize devolution of law enforcement functions through expanded cooperative

arrangements with local law enforcement agencies.

Direct the immediate establishment of a combined field and Headquarters

management advisory team to review, prioritize, and develop a strategy for complex wide

implementation of the tactical and training recommendations that are not

explicitly addressed above.

Recommendation 2-

Expand the PFWG charter to encompass the responsibility for development of a detailed action plan to federalize those DOE PFs directly involved in the protection of nuclear weapons, SNM, or other strategic national security assets, When this plan has been successfully completed, direct its execution.

The first recommendation is explicitly intended to rapidly advance the Department's protective forces to the level of capability necessary to counter the new DBT. The second recommendation is intended to provide a basis for developing concrete, detailed management options leading to the creation of a federalized force. The purpose of federalization is not to fulfill some abstract concept of management, but rather to provide a solid long-term foundation for a combat-oriented protective force. The actions detailed in the first recommendation can and must be accomplished as rapidly as possible. The second recommendation, however, comprehends the fact that federalization cannot be rushed if it is to be effectively implemented. Furthermore, the long term goal of federalization does not preclude interim organizational and management reforms

designed to improve the effectiveness of contractor-managed forces.

The PFWG's conclusion is based upon consideration of current requirements, previous studies conducted by DOE, input from field protective force personnel, past recommendations from the General Accounting Office (GAO), and exploration of a range of potential organizational models. The following sections of this paper present the rationale for the two recommendations presented above.

3.0 Rationale

The departure point for recommending the creation of an elite force-and for exploring the

federalization option-is the very same underlying assumption that informed the Secretary's May, 2004, speech announcing security initiatives, namely the fact that the 911 1 attacks on the U.S. fundamentally changed the threat environment in which DOE protective forces are called to operate. The 9/11 attacks and the accumulation of threat information that has followed since all point to a single conclusion: our current terrorist adversary is committed to the conduct of mass casualty producing attacks within the U.S.; attacks designed to achieve decisive results in favor of the terrorists' political agenda.

This single fact leads inexorably to a number of conclusions about DOE'S protective posture.

First, DOE is responsible for a number of national security targets--chiefly, but not exclusively related to nuclear materials-whose exploitation by a terrorist could result in precisely the kind of disasters that would serve the terrorist agenda; second, sufficient public attention has been focused on these DOE targets in recent years to ensure that terrorist planners are aware of their potential; and, third, the effective defense of these targets cannot be viewed as solely or even primarily-the responsibility of the nation's military and intelligence agencies. In other words, while it is important that the U.S. has disrupted terrorist organizations and bases overseas, it cannot be assumed that such disruption has rendered the terrorists incapable of mounting significant actions inside the U.S. Indeed, the post 9/11 evolution of the DOE Design Basis Threat (DBT) points in precisely the opposite direction. The urgent need to effectively respond to the new DBT by creating a combat-oriented protective force explains the series of specific upgrade actions presented as part of Recommendation 1.

The reasons for these specific actions were developed in greater detail in the PFWG's earlier report concerning standards for elite force performance. In general, the concept involved raising standards of training, physical fitness, weaponry and equipment, and tactical concepts in order to ensure the rapid transformation of existing forces into units capable of countering the new DBT adversary. As noted in the PFWG's earlier report, all of these actions can be initiated and many can be completed without reference to the larger protective force organizational or contractual model. Moreover, while many of these actions speak to the need for cultural change within the protective force community, none of them requires the full accomplishment of such change as a pre-condition for management action. The need to effect such cultural change and to create a solid foundation for long term success of the combat model leads to the conclusion that federalization deserves careful consideration.

Recommendation 2 establishes the framework for advancing this process. Although

federalization was discussed on several occasions during the 1990's, the context for these

discussions was largely cost containment and the desire to minimize protection disruptions related to potential work stoppages. In other words, the context of these discussions was almost totally unrelated to the issues that now confront the Department. But as the published report of the 9/11 commission recently concluded, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were transformative events. In the DOE context, the transformation is most manifested in the change in expectations regarding DOE protective forces. Although prior to 9/11 the DOE acknowledged an armed terrorist threat at its facilities, the acknowledged threat was relatively modest and the responsibility of defeating that threat, although significant, was but one of many responsibilities assumed by DOE protective forces. On a practical day-to-day basis, these forces were much more concerned with a broad range of industrial security and order-keeping functions than with preparation to conduct a defensive battle against a large, well-trained, and well-armed

paramilitary style attacker. The Secretary's May speech drew a firm line between past and future protective force missions. In the future, the fundamental protective force mission would be to fight just such a battle and to do it as effectively as one of the U.S.'s elite military forces. In this conception, the old industrial security model was decisively subordinated to a "combat force" model. This new model carries profound legal and practical implications, all of which tend to support adoption of the Federal force option.

3.1 Legal Considerations

Industrial security is generally acknowledged to be a legitimately private function. Although law enforcement is customarily regarded as a governmental function, U.S. law has typically allowed for some overlap between private security and law enforcement, and the Code of Federal Regulations, as applied to nuclear facilities, has long been interpreted as allowing (although not requiring, or even preferring) the arming of contractor forces to maintain the security of nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, even a focus on "law enforcement" as the defining paradigm for protection of nuclear facilities takes this mission well along the path to becoming "inherently governmental."

But DOE nuclear facilities and other national security assets clearly go beyond the conventional "civilian infrastructure" definitions that might, for example, be applied to NRC-regulated nuclear power generation facilities. First and foremost, DOE nuclear facilities are nuclear weapons production facilities--even the materials at closure sites are legacy materials from the nuclear weapons program. They can include a wide variety of nuclear weapons materials, components, test devices, partial assemblies, and even complete weapons themselves. These, unquestionably, are national security assets and, viewed as potential terrorist targets--either for theft or sabotage-they have unmistakable national defense implications.3 The only directly comparable targets in the U.S. that do not belong to DOE are protected by the armed forces and have been since the beginning of the Atomic Age.

In the post-9/1 1 war against terrorism, DOE protective forces must be viewed as having a quasi-military mission and the Secretary has made it clear that they should be defended in a manner consistent with defensive military combat operations. This places the role of DOE protective forces squarely within the framework of inherently governmental functions. In the course of its deliberations, the PFWG reviewed the "Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998," or the FAIR Act, along with its implementing policy, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76 (Revised)."Performance of Commercial Activities." These documents define "inherently governmental function" and they state clearly that such functions shall not be performed by contractors. The most relevant text comes from A-76, Attachment A, B. l.a(2) and (3). "An inherently governmental function is an activity that is so intimately related to the public

interest as to mandate performance by government personnel"; it involves: ". . .protecting

property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action.. .significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of private persons."

Even some non-nuclear DOE assets exist to support an explicit national security mission. Consider, for example, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, designed to assure petroleum resources to the nation in the event of war or other forms of international disruption of petroleum supplies. Clearly, an effort on the part of terrorists to sabotage the

Reserve meets the definition of an "act of war."  The fact that these assets targets are the responsibility of DOE and the Defense Department follows from the division between civilian and military control of the nuclear weapons program that is enshrined in the Atomic Energy Act.

Regardless of the need for protective forces to perform many time-consuming routine duties that may be appropriate for a contracted guard force, those activities are secondary to the primary responsibility to defend against terrorist attack. In addition, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), subpart 7.5, "Inherently Governmental Functions," provides an example of an inherently governmental activity:

7.503(~)(3). "The command of military forces, especially the leadership of military

personnel who are members of the combat, combat support, or combat service support

role." While it may be argued fairly that the mission of protecting DOE national security assets has been carried out in the past primarily by contracted services, the permissive basis for that condition, Section 161 .k. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), is directed at the outset toward "...such of its [the Commission] members, officers, and employees as it deems necessary in the interest of the common defense and security to carry firearms while in the discharge of their official duties." This is a clear reference to Federal employees of the Atomic Energy Commission, the juridical predecessor to the Department of Energy. The Act goes on to state, "The Commission may also [emphasis added] authorize such of those employees of its contractors and subcontractors (at any tier) engaged in the protection of property under the jurisdiction of the United States located at facilities owned by or contracted to the United States or being transported to or from such facilities as it deems necessary in the interests of the common defense and security to carry firearms while iri the discharge of their official duties."

The tradition of contracted protective forces within the Department resulted in the generation of 10 CFR 1046, "Physical Protection of Security Interests," which establishes the medical and physical fitness qualifications as well as the training requirements for "DOE contractor [emphasis added] employees at Government-owned facilities."

 In contrast, 10 CFR 1047,

"Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force by Protective Force Officers," applies to "DOE [emphasis added] DOE contractor protective force personnel armed pursuant to Section 161.k. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 201 1, et seq.) to protect nuclear weapons, classified matter, nuclear facilities, and related property." The Rule is sufficiently broad to cover both Federal and contractor protective force personnel. There is, in other words, nothing in past practice or formal precedent to indicate that Federal protective forces are inappropriate, and the longstanding practice of relying upon contractor protective forces should not be regarded as prohibiting the Department's ability to adjust to a structure and strategy more suitable for countering the current threat.

The primary mission of the DOE protective forces is to defeat an armed adversary as defined in the Design Basis Threat, which is armed combat by a military-type force. To answer the obvious question-why not simply turn the DOE protective force mission over to the military-it should be noted that (1) this would inordinately complicate coordination of site security and site operations, which would reside in completely separate agencies; (2) the military already has a sufficiently complicated set of mission requirements without adding one in which they've expressed little interest; (3) the legal authority for the military to act within civil jurisdictions has, since the Civil War, been a complicated issue that does not need to be re-visited; and (4) the Atomic Energy Act clearly envisions civilian control of the assets in DOE custody. The PEWG Phase I report developed a series of recommendations that provided a clear focus on the primary combat mission. The post 9/11 evolution of the Design Basis Threat and the necessary DOE response to the evolving threat argues persuasively for the conclusion that DOE site defense is an

inherently governmental function that should be executed by a Federal protective force.

3.2 Practical Benefits to the Federal Option

The arguments in favor of the Federal option are not solely those of legal status. Numerous practical benefits will also accrue in implementing the elite force envisioned by the Secretary. Operationally, protective force reinforcement at a given site is presently hampered by a continuing lack of standardization of training and equipment and by the fact that, for potential or imminent work stoppage deployment, collective bargaining unit (CBU) members from one site cannot be deployed to another. Federalization would correct that inefficiency. In addition, the principal need for such interoperability-work stoppages-would then no longer be a factor. Federalization would permit a site-by-site assessment of enhanced weaponry needs, and greater speed in procurement of needed weapons and supporting special equipment. Also, the growing number of providers who are owned by foreign entities adds an additional argument for DOE to divest itself of the traditional dependence on contractors. Loss of site management authority and potential disruption of facility operational mission is of concern, but there is no reason why a gradual conversion of the site force to Federal status should be a threat to site management. On sites where the security services provider has a direct contract with DOE, such as the Savannah River Site and the Nevada Test Site, no lack of cooperation or coordination with the Management and Operating (M&O) contractor exists at present, nor is there a significant history of conflict. Moreover, DOE sites are, in the final analysis, Federal sites, responsible to Federal field element managers who are in turn responsible to appropriate Headquarters elements. Changing the status of protective forces may change current reporting chains, but, depending on the structure selected, it may not change ultimate management responsibility.

Allowing for site-specific requirements, federalization would encourage a higher level of

standardization of training, testing, weapons, entry/access control technology, uniforms, and other equipment. In particular, it directly addresses the problem of ensuring that DOE protective forces are allowed to acquire and deploy the kind of advanced weaponry and munitions that are essential to defeating the Design Basis Threat adversary in a cost effective manner. At present, DOE is confronting a choice between greater reliance on technology or a greater reliance on manpower as a means of dealing with the evolving threat. Although the technological option includes a broad range of capabilities, including improved intrusion detection and delay capabilities, a vital part of the technology equation is weaponry. Bluntly stated, there are two ways of increasing protective force firepower. One can either vastly increase the size of protective forces by adding large numbers of personnel wielding currently available weapons which would be hugely expensive and only partially effective, given the nature of the threat.

The rapid conversion and hiring of airport screeners by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the wake of 911 1 was met with resistance from both contractors and unions but it was not sufficient to prevent the conversion process.

Alternatively, one can take a force of comparable size to existing forces and give it more capable weapons. Although DOE contractor protective forces are already exploring, with varying degrees of success, the acquisition and deployment of more effective weapons, they have encountered a variety of difficulties in this area. These problems will only grow worse as the Department seeks to solve tactical problems through the acquisition of grenade launchers, light anti-armor systems, and other weapons not customarily sanctioned for use by non-governmental personnel. Federal forces should not experience the obstacles placed in the way of contractor protective forces by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) for purchase of enhanced weaponry and some types of ammunition. From a procurement standpoint, a consolidated force will also enhance the Department's ability to join major Department of Defense (DoD) procurement.

A unitary Federal force would permit the establishment of a centralized personnel management system designed to facilitate the "elite force" concept by providing a truly professional, overarching career structure, a recruiting system, basic training assignment at the DOE National Training Center (NTC), and subsequent deployment to the sites.

Thus, the sites would receive basic-trained personnel through careful recruitment oriented to site needs complex-wide.

Personnel would have the potential for advancement or lateral transfer throughout the complex as well as the ability to apply for opportunities in other agencies.

In order to mitigate undue employment concerns on the part of current protective force

Personnel, many of whom would be potential candidates for a Federal force-DOE must do a thorough job of presenting the timing, benefits, and advantages of conversion. The transition to a Federal force would be greatly facilitated if protective force members receive appropriate assurances concerning continuation of their vested retirement funds, along with appropriate emphasis on the career opportunities associated with becoming part of a national organization with promotion and assignment opportunities on all converted sites. A further means of easing such transition concerns would be a process of "grandfathering" current personnel into the new force. Although the PFWG has defined the "elite force" at least in part in terms of a high level of physical capability-which would be promoted by inclusion of a 20-year retirement system modeled on other Federal law enforcement entities [or DOE'S own Federal Office of Secure Transportation (OST)]-the PFWG also recognized that, in a transitional period, room could be found for otherwise suitable personnel who did not meet all projected physical standards. This distinction is spelled out in our previous position paper, in the discussion of "fixed" versus "flexible" fighters.

Elimination of reluctance by Federal state/local law enforcement agencies (FSLLEA) to share criminal intelligence and other threat information with a contract force would be a significant advantage, both for force morale purposes and for developing a consistent relationship with the FSLLEA. This becomes even more important in the implementation of the "elite force" concept as many site law enforcement-related functions can, and should, be negotiated to appropriate local jurisdictions. It will also assist in the sometimes-elusive establishment of workable,

It should be noted that, even though contractor-issued protective force weapons are "government furnished equipment," which offers a path around the acquisition hurdles for advanced weaponry, this fact should not be allowed to obscure the associated legal and liability complications that may arise for the contractor in using these weapons, or even in conducting realistic training.

Dependable Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) regarding response for reinforcement, establishing an outer perimeter, pursuit, and other joint operations during a security incident.

A unitary Federal force also offers benefits in terms of standardization of performance

expectations, as well as standardization of training and other associated activities essential to ensuring uniform high quality.7 While it is true that some of these same standardization benefits might be realized through a sole contractor force, the transition to such a force would be, in many respects, as complex as the transition to a Federal force. It would involve the same legal issues with respect to the status of existing contracts, and it would result in the creation of a single immense contract that, however attractive for the successful bidder, would also be even more contentious than federalization. Such a contract would be the likely object of legal protest and political concern, particularly in an environment in which Congressional and other interests

have focused attention on issues of contractor performance and foreign ownership of major security contract competitors. If, as the PFWG believes, a unitary force is essential to ensuring effective standardization and uniform high quality performance, then the "unitary contract model" offers no comparative benefits, and significant potential liabilities.

3.3 Cost Considerations

The cost of a uniform pay system with appropriate area cost of living allowances could be offset to some extent by the loss of contract overhead, general and administrative costs (G&A), and fees that go to contractor corporate support. Retirement accounts could move from their current corporate accounts into a central retirement pool. No individual would need to be concerned with the loss of vested funds. Some other aspects of federalization will provide additional cost offsets:

Training for PF personnel in use of their equipment will be more cost-efficient since the

training will apply to any new site to which the PF member may be sent. No additional

training on unfamiliar equipment will be required.

The adoption of Federal employment benefits will save the government money directly as

well as indirectly, in that it will no longer be paying the, contractor overhead on individual policies or fringe benefits.

The PFWG has not performed a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Such analysis would require a fully developed and detailed proposal for federalization, which is beyond the scope of the group's current tasking. However, it has reviewed previous studies of this issue, noting that, while most such studies demonstrated that federalization would offer no significant cost benefit, neither did they argue that it would result in substantial increased costs, in and of itself. The best currently available evidence indicates that, while there would be additional costs associated with managing the process of transition to a Federal force, the long-term operating costs of a Federal force should be comparable to continuation of the current contract model.

For example, it would encourage standardized "external adversary force" application for performance testing, while eliminating award-fee-driven pressures on security services providers to field less-than-adequate adversary elements to ensure successful performance test outcomes.

Whether the costs of implementation are offset completely by these considerations is not, in the final analysis, as important in the post 9/11 world as it once was. It must be accepted that costs will increase no matter which course is chosen to implement the "elite force" concept.

3.4 Precede- and Potential Models

It should be noted that the Department's own history illustrates the fact that the Federal option is and of itself is no panacea. DOE's predecessor organization, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), operated a Federal force for several years. Similarly, DOE has experience also with the Federal Protective Service as a provider of security services. In neither of these cases were the results achieved particularly satisfactory from a performance standpoint; however, .those examples do not prove that federalization cannot be made to work. At the same time, this history does demonstrate that the most important aspect of ensuring quality is the expectation of quality, rather than the particular organizational framework adopted. In developing long-term implementation plans for the potential adoption of a Federal force it will be necessary to ensure that the insistence on excellence as a first-priority objective is not lost in the discussion of the

ways and means of federalization itself. There are a variety of existing organizations whose history and present status provide at least some insight into how a DOE Federal protective force might be implemented. In addition to examining a variety of other Federal law enforcement organizations, the PFWG had focused attention upon the U.S. Coast Guard and upon DOE'S own OST, which employs armed Federal personnel to protect shipments of nuclear and other national security assets in the continental

U.S. The group also considered the government's recent experience in implementing the

Congressionally-mandated federalized Transportation Security Agency.

Although none of these other organizational experiences provides a complete template for federalization of DOE protective forces, their various experiences do provide useful insights into the potentialities and pitfalls of the process. The Coast Guard exemplifies a solution to crafting a Federal organization that combines a civilian law enforcement mission with a military combat mission, all under the leadership of a civilian agency. While OST's past history demonstrates that the simple fact of federalization is no guarantee of consistently good labor relations, its current experience suggests that, with the right employment framework, protective force-type operations in a Federal setting can be properly incentivized, with positive results. OST also provides some very concrete precedents for the operation of a Federal force within the DOE organizational framework.

The political developments leading to the creation of the TSA serve as a reminder that, despite general government trends away from increasing the size of the Federal work force, political support for such measures can be generated when such an action is seen as promoting security. If sufficient political support can be generated for an organization whose mission is to screen airline passengers, then it follows that even more support could be generated for a force whose mission consists of preparing for-and if necessary, fighting-a pitched battle in defense of a nuclear weapons facility.

4.0 Path Forward

In keeping with its original tasking, the PFWG has developed and presented a recommendation that the Department implement the "Federal force concept" as a means of ensuring the long-term viability of the "elite force model." However, the recommendation and its accompanying supporting arguments do not constitute an appropriately detailed implementation plan suitable for management decision. Furthermore, the PFWG strongly believes that, in the near-term, the Department would realize substantial security benefits by implementing, as fully as possible, the "elite force" recommendations that have already been presented. Therefore, our recommended path forward consists of two major points:

First, immediate steps should be taken to begin implementation of elite force measures

detailed as part of Recommendation 1.

Second, appropriate steps should be taken to develop a detailed implementation plan for

creation of the Federal force, as provided in Recommendation 2.

These two steps, which will require strong Federal leadership, are described in the following subsections.

4.1 Near- Term Measures

Transforming the Department's protective forces into elite paramilitary defenders of our most critical national security assets will require extensive planning and considerable resources from virtually all program offices and support functions throughout the complex. The process of training and equipping personnel and providing the necessary physical systems and technologies to supplement their skills should proceed as rapidly as possible. The process of converting the existing contractor force to Federal.employment status may take considerable time and should not be hurried. Nevertheless, several measures recommended in the PFWG Phase I report can be undertaken immediately as a means to energize the creation of an elite force and provide impetus for the tasks and actions that require more intricate implementation. Broadly speaking, the focus of this effort should be upon implementation of the major recommendations-and, in particular, the detailed sub-recommendations-presented in the PFWG's previous elite force submission (and detailed under Recommendation I, pp. 2-3 above).

The immediate establishment of a combined field and Headquarters management advisory team should be directed to review, prioritize, and develop a strategy for complex-wide implementation of the tactical and training recommendations that are not explicitly addressed above.

4.2 Planning for the Federal Option

The PFWG's recommendation in favor of federalization follows from the need to implement an organizational and management approach consistent with the cultural, legal, and moral imperatives of a combat mission requirement. In the final analysis, the fundamental argument for federalization is that being asked to die or to kill for one's country should mean having the unmistakable full measure of government involvement and support. Protective force members deserve nothing less. On a practical level, however, there are many unresolved questions associated with the implementation of the Federal option. These include such vital issues as the organizational placement of the Federal force within DOE, the relationship of the unified force to DOE field management, and the particular human resources and personnel package that can be devised to support the anticipated requirement. To address these complex and wide-ranging issues, an expanded version of the PFWG, led by designated senior management and augmented with appropriate additional field and other technical representation (i.e., human resources, contracting/procurement to include A-76 expertise, protective force management, collective bargaining representation, etc.), should be constituted to conduct a detailed analysis of relevant organizational and administrative factors leading to the development of a detailed Federal protective force model and implementation plan. The end product of this effort would identify and describe a Federal protective force organizational model that will serve as a template for the transformation of DOE protective forces in a manner consistent with the Secretary's vision. The target date for the presentation of this product should be September 30,2005.

5.0 Conclusion

In the end, the goal of complete federalization may prove to be elusive. Still, even if the

practical barriers are ultimately determined to outweigh the principles that argue for

federalization, a variety of potential interim steps could be considered. These include contract

reforms designed to increase the accountability of protective contractors for effective

performance and to ensure that contract incentives are appropriately aligned with the needs of the

elite force concept. Also essential would be more energetic leadership from the Federal

management level, both in the field and at Headquarters. While the PFWG does not believe that such interim measures offer as much promise as federalization, they may represent the achievable middle ground. Only one thing is unacceptable, namely the announcement of a long list of upgrades without a corresponding long-term commitment to excellence and without recognition that the devotion, hard work, and potential sacrifice of protective force members equals that of all other military, law enforcement, and security professionals in the Federal government.